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RETURN OF INEQUALITY IN MODERN SOCIETY?
Test by Dispersion of Life-Satisfaction Across Time and Nations*
ABSTRACT. It is said that inequality is returning to modern nations and that
this is manifest in the widening disparities in income in the late 20th century.
This trend is attributed to neo-liberalism, globalisation and immigration, and is
seen as a turn in the long-term trend towards a more civilised society. In this
paper I challenge the idea of rising inequality. I argue that income difference
falls short as an indicator of inequality and cannot be meaningfully compared
across time. Instead I propose to measure inequality in another way, not by
difference in presumed chances for a good life, but by the dispersion of actual
outcomes of life, using the standard deviation of life-satisfaction as an indi-
cator. Comparison across time in EU nations over the years 1973–2001 shows
that the dispersion of life-satisfaction became smaller instead of larger. Com-
parison across 80 nations in the 1990s also shows lower dispersion in the most
modern countries. So the trend towards greater equality seems to persist. If
there is any truth in the theory that access to scarce resources has become more
unequal, the tendency must have been compensated in some way, possibly by
greater equality in personal capabilities.
INTRODUCTION
The Issue: Return to Greater Inequality?
Social inequality exists in all human societies, but some societies
are more unequal than others. The degree of inequality in soci-
ety is linked to the stage of societal evolution. Original hunter-
gatherer societies were typically egalitarian, since accumulation
of goods and power is hardly possible in its way of life. Harsh
inequality was introduced in human society when our forefa-
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thers changed to a sedentary way of life where property of land
and stocks became crucial. In these agrarian societies, warrior
castes came to exploit the peasant population, slavery was
introduced and women came to be discriminated (Sanderson,
1995: 333–4). Inequality was particularly high in the advanced
stage of agrarian society, where a 2% feudal elite consumed
more than half of the gross national product (Nolan and Lenski,
2004: 169). Inequities were much reduced in the change to indus-
trial society during the last centuries. Inequality in income
decreased much, though it may have increased in the first phase
of industrialisation.1 Inequalities in political power and social
respect were also much abated, especially after the introduction
of general suffrage and the development of welfare states (Nolan
and Lenski, 2004: 271). Still inequalities in present day industrial
societies are greater than they used to be in hunter-gatherer soci-
eties. The findings on this subject are schematized in Figure 1.
This recent reduction of inequality in modern society is wide-
ly acknowledged and has been welcomed as ‘the death of class’
(Pakulski and Waters, 1996). The change is generally seen as
the gradual fulfilment of the main promise of the French revo-
lution (egalite´). Progress optimists see it even as part of an
ongoing evolution towards a more civilised society.
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Figure 1. Long-term development of social inequality.
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Yet recent developments challenge the prospect of continuous
egalisation in advanced societies. Since the 1980s there has been
a growing concern about ‘modern’ inequality, both in the politi-
cal arena and among social scientists. This modern inequality is
denoted by words such as ‘poverty’ and ‘social exclusion’. The
trend is characterised by terms such as ‘polarisation’ and ‘bi-
partition’ and is seen to give rise to a ‘two-third society’ in
which a large minority is increasingly falling back. One issue in
this discourse is the persistence of old inequalities in modern
society, in particular the continuance of social class. A spokes-
man for this view is Marshall (1997). Another issue is the
appearance of ‘new’ inequalities, such as between pensioners
and young adults, and between settled citizens and new immi-
grants. Noll (1999) has crisply reviewed this literature.
Modern inequality is attributed to modern developments, in
particular to neo-liberalism and globalisation, which are seen to
be to the advantage of a professional elite but to involve most
people in a ‘race to the bottom’. These forces will also strip the
welfare state and therefore cause the downfall to be deeper.
Immigration will also play a role, because migrants enter soci-
ety from the bottom and are easy prey for exploitation (e.g.
Sassen, 1991; Wilterdink, 1993). The growing complexity of
society is also seen to widen the gap between high educated and
low educated citizens.
All this suggests that we are facing a new rise of inequality.
Harrisson and Bluestone (1988) refer to this development as
‘The Great U-Turn’, meaning that the downward trend of
inequality is reverting into an upward trend. This latter theory
is depicted with the dotted line at the right in Figure 1.
If inequality were indeed returning in modern society, it
would be a severe blow to progress optimism. It would also be
a testimonium paupertatis for social democracy. New inequality
could further bring various harmful consequences in its trail,
such as social turbulence and possibly revolutionary upheaval.
For these reasons several politicians call for timely counter-
measure, among which the conservation of the welfare state,
and in line with this the European Union has proclaimed the
combating of poverty and social exclusion to be a political
priority (Lisbon declaration 2001).
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Before swallowing the medicine one should check the diagno-
sis. Is inequality on the return? That is an empirical question.
To answer it we need a good measure of social inequality, pref-
erably a comprehensive measure that allows comparison over
time and across nations. Unfortunately we lack such a measure
as yet. Current empirical measures of inequality are pretty
much tailored to the last century’s situation and are not suited
for charting long-term development.
Current Measures of Inequality in Nations
Social inequality is typically conceived as difference in access to
scarce resources. In sociological textbooks the most commonly
mentioned scarce resources are ‘income’, ‘power’ and ‘prestige’.
These were central issues in the 20th century emancipation
movements of labourers and women and still shape the dis-
course on inequality today. In the practice of measurement the
concept is narrowed even further.
Focus on Having
Difference in ‘ access’ to scarce resources is typically measured
by being in ‘command’ of the said scarce resources. That is: not
by the assets one could have, but by the assets one actually has.
The reason is obviously pragmatic, it is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to measure potential assets. Still, this practice defines peo-
ple who do not care about money, power or prestige as
‘deprived’ and thereby equals difference in ‘preference’ with dif-
ference in ‘chance’. People who opt for a modest lifestyle, such
as hippies or early retirees, are classified as ‘poor’ and society is
held responsible for their condition. Yet the more lifestyles
diverge, the less is this practice defensible.
Restriction to Income
Difference in ‘command of resources’ is typically measured by
difference in ‘income’. The reason is again pragmatic. It is diffi-
cult to quantify differences in power and prestige, and certainly
to follow change in these matters over time.
Though income is the best measurable resource, comparison
of income inequality over time is beset with methodological
problems.2 As a result there is quite some divergence in
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estimates of the trend in income inequality. The most sophisti-
cated studies suggest that income inequality rose in some nations
at the end of the 20th century, particularly in the UK and the
USA. Yet this did not happen in all western nations, for
instance, income inequality seems to have remained stable in
West Germany and to have decreased in Ireland, France and
Finland (Alderson and Nielsen, 2002; Ritakallio, 2001).
Weaknesses
Even if income inequality had risen in all modern nations, it
would not have marked a wider return of social inequality.
Income was not such a scarce resource at the end of the 20th
century as it was at the beginning. Incomes tripled in this era.
As a result, ‘relative’ poverty was less often found in conjunc-
tion with ‘absolute’ poverty. The new ‘poor’ in affluent nations
do not face starvation. At the top of the income distribution
one can see signs of diminishing returns. Though the rich tend
to be happier than the poor, that difference is smaller in poor
nations than in rich ones. In an affluent society such as the
Netherlands income differences explain only some 3% of the
variation in happiness (Veenhoven, 1997) and the causal effect
of income on happiness is probably less.3
At a more basic level one can question the concept of ‘differential
access to scarce resources’ as such.
Firstly, there is a problem with the notion of ‘scarcity’.
Something is ‘scarce’ if many want it but few can have, e.g. the
best seats in a theatre or the biggest house in town. In this
sense inequality is inevitable, since the supply of ‘best’ things is
limited and the demand for it endless. Yet not everything wan-
ted is really needed. We can also live with a place in the third
row of the theatre and in an average house. Hence social policy
typically aims at providing everybody with the necessities of life
rather than trying to fulfil ever rising aspirations. Seen in that
light, we should not bother about all inequalities, but only
about inequalities that really hurt.
Secondly there is a problem in the focus on ‘resources’.
Though it is obvious that we need resources to gratify our
needs, it is not so obvious what resources are most critical for
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this purpose. Are income, power and prestige really the key
resources? One can think of resources that link up more evi-
dently with human needs, such as ‘love’ (required for one of
Maslow’s mayor deficiency needs) and ‘challenge’ (required for
growth needs). The resources measured in inequality research
are in fact things that investigators assume to be necessary for a
good life. Though such assumptions may have been realistic in
historic conditions of austerity, they could be less applicable
today.
This brings me to the wider point that it not so clear how
much we need of the resources assumed to be essential for a
good life. More is not always better, since resources are typi-
cally subject to the law of diminishing returns. This is even true
for meta-resources such as income; the richer we get, the less
additional income adds to our happiness (Veenhoven and Tim-
mermans, 1998). Still another point is that it is typically not
separate resources that matter, but the total resource mix. This
leads into difficult questions about minimum requirements and
synergetic effects. Restricting measurement to command of
money does not solve that problem, since money cannot buy
everything.
These theoretical doubts are supported by recent empirical
evidence. Income inequality in nations appears almost unrelated
to final quality of life as measured by average happiness and
health (Veenhoven, 1996: 34).4 Apparently, income difference
does not really hurt in present day affluent societies.5
Given these weaknesses of the current measure of social
inequality, it is worth considering alternative methods. In this
paper I propose a radically different approach, based on
insights from the field of quality-of-life research.
An Alternative Measure of Social Inequality
Above we have seen that the current approach measures
inequality by differences in access to scarce resources, in other
words, as difference in life-chances. An alternative is to mea-
sure social inequality by dispersion of life-results. Following
this, I propose to measure inequality in nations by the disper-
sion of life-satisfaction. Below I expand on that approach and
enumerate its advantages.
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Distinction Between Life-Chances and Life-Results
Life-chances are preconditions for a good life; life-results mark
a good life itself. Both chances and results can be either ‘exter-
nal’ or ‘internal’. Together these distinctions produce the four
‘qualities of life’ presented in Figure 2.
External life-chances are those environmental conditions
required for a good life. Biologists refer to these conditions as
the ‘biotope’. This consists of the physical conditions required
for life, such as suitable air and availability of food, and more
importantly, for social animals it also involves the ‘sociotope’
they form with congeners. In the case of humans that is society.
I denote the quality of the whole of external life-chances with
the word ‘livability’.
Internal life-chances are the individual’s capabilities to
exploit these environmental chances. Biologists call this ‘fitness’,
since the required capabilities depend on environmental
demands. Internal chances involve typically appropriate physi-
cal and mental functioning; they also involve responsive devel-
opment of capabilities, such as intelligence. I refer to this all as
‘life-ability’. I will come back to this matter in the discussion
section.
External life-results are the environmental effects of a life. In
biological thinking this is an organism’s functionality in the
ecological system, in sociological thinking it is a person’s contri-
bution to society. I refer to the whole of these effects as the
‘utility’ of life. Although I do not use this concept in this paper,
the above is to clarify the difference with ‘internal’ life-results’.
External Internal 
Life-chances Livability Life-ability 
Life-results Utility of life Satisfaction with life
Source: Veenhoven 2000 
Figure 2. Four qualities of life.
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Internal life-results are the outcomes of life for an individual.
Biologists emphasise ‘survival’ in this context. Alongside mere
continuation of life one can also consider enjoyment of it.
Mobile organisms can feel good or bad, probably because this
is required for finding a livable biotope. The development of
cognition in humans has not annulled this affective signal sys-
tem, it has just enabled us to estimate and articulate average
affect and on that basis judge the quality of our life as a whole.
Hence in the case of humans the internal results of life also
manifest in life-satisfaction. This provides a basis for measuring
inequality in life-results.
Focus on Disparity in Life-Results
I have discussed these concepts in more detail elsewhere
(Veenhoven, 2000). In that paper I also considered their mea-
surability, in particular the possibility of comprehensive mea-
surement. I argued that current sum-scores add apples and
oranges and fail to acknowledge that external requirements
depend on internal abilities (pp. 26–29). I concluded that only
internal results of life can be measured comprehensively because
the total reflects in how long and happy people live (pp. 31–33).
On that basis, I reasoned that the livability of a society can
only be measured indirectly by the final quality of life of its citi-
zens as expressed in degree and duration of life-satisfaction (pp.
33, see also Veenhoven, 1996). In this paper I extend this view
to the measurement of social inequality. Social inequality is
measured indirectly using the dispersion life-satisfaction.
Restriction to Disparity in Life-Satisfaction
The first attempt to measure social inequality using dispersion
in life-results considered variation in years lived among mem-
bers of society. LeGrand (1987) estimated dispersion in age at
death in 32 countries around 1980. He quantified these differ-
ences in Gini-coefficients and in an Atkinson Index. Together
with Joop Ehrhardt I did a similar analysis for 29 nations in
the 1980’s (Veenhoven, 1993: 132–4). One problem with this
method is that it applies only for generations that have already
died. Hence it informs us about inequality in the past. Another
problem is that data fall short. Life-tables are only available for
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a limited number of countries and these data often do not allow
comparison across time. Hence I decided to drop this indicator
for the time being.6
An alternative is to measure inequality by dispersion in life-
satisfaction. To do this one can use surveys and consider disper-
sion in responses to questions about enjoyment of life. This
method does provide timely data. I have explored this approach
in several earlier papers (Veenhoven, 1990, 1995). Initially the
data were too limited to be conclusive, but meanwhile more and
better data have become available, and this now allows compar-
ison across time and nations. I make use that opportunity in
this paper.
Measurement by Standard Deviation of Life-Satisfaction
Life-satisfaction can be measured by simply asking people how
they feel about their life as a whole. This is common practice in
quality-of-life surveys. Inequality of life-satisfaction in a nation
manifests in the distribution of responses in a general popula-
tion sample and can be quantified using statistics of dispersion.
The standard deviation appears to be one of the most suitable
statistics for this purpose (Kalmijn and Veenhoven, 2005).
Accordingly, I propose to measure social inequality in nations
using the standard deviation of life-satisfaction.
Doubts About Life-Satisfaction
The study of life-satisfaction has developed considerably over
the last decade (Diener, 1999; Veenhoven, 1997), but there are
still many qualms about measurability, comparability and
the significance of the matter. Many of these misgivings can
also be raised when applying this concept to inequality.
Measurability. With respect to measurability, it has been main-
tained that self-reports of life-satisfaction do not reflect well
how people actually feel about their life. One argument is that
people do not really know their true feelings, another that they
do not report what they feel honestly. It has also been argued
that life-satisfaction cannot be compared interpersonally. Objec-
tions of this kind have instigated a lot of empirical validation
research, which so far has refuted these qualms. (e.g. Saris and
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Scherpenzeel, 1996; Veenhoven, 1997, 1998). It appears that
almost all adults have an idea about how they feel about life
and that they report this fairly honestly in anonymous inter-
views. The predictive power of life-satisfaction self-ratings
implies that the experiential range does not differ too much. In
an adaptive perspective it is also rather unlikely that the range
of experience differs very much among congeners.
Comparability. It has also been claimed that life-satisfaction
cannot be compared across cultures.
A main theoretical argument is that standards of the good
life are culture specific. An assumption behind this objection
is that life-satisfaction is ‘calculated’ cognitively by comparing
life-as-it-is with collective notions of how-life-should-be; life-
satisfaction is in fact equated with contentment. That assump-
tion fits nicely with psychological cognitivism and sociological
constructionism, but it does not match the evolutionary view. I
have already placed life-satisfaction in this perspective (see
above), arguing that adaptation of higher organisms is guided
by affective signals and that humans are conscious of how they
feel and can estimate and articulate their average mood. There
is good evidence that appraisals of life-satisfaction draw on this
affective information in the first place (Veenhoven, 1991, 1997,
and 2000), and since mood is a universal intuitive experience, so
must be life-satisfaction.
Next, a methodical argument holds that cross-cultural com-
parabily is thwarted by systematic differences in measurement
bias. It is claimed that Americans overstate their happiness
while the Japanese tend to understatement. As yet there is no
direct evidence for such distortions and the high explanatory
power7 of average life-satisfaction in nations makes it unlikely
that it bears much significance. Moreover, these misgivings con-
cern the comparability of average level of life-satisfaction in
nations, while the focus is here on differences in life-satisfaction
within nations. Even if the level of life-satisfaction is overstated
in some nations, the difference within can still be comparable.
The question is rather whether there are cultural factors that
differentially effect the dispersion of responses across nations.
One such factor could be the tendency to present oneself as
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average and prefer the middle category of response scales. This
tendency has been attributed to the Japanese (Iijima, 1982 ), but
that view is not supported by the data. Another distortion
could be in cultural differences in aptness to exaggerate. Prefer-
ence for extreme answers will inflate standard deviations of life-
satisfaction. This source of bias could be a problem in compari-
sons across nations8 but is unlikely to affect comparison
through time within nations.
Significance. A related objection holds that life-satisfaction
bears no significance. If life-satisfaction depends on the gap
between standards and reality, one can get satisfaction by low-
ering standards. Life-satisfaction is thus put to one side with
resignation. In a similar vein it is argued that life-satisfaction is
an evanescent thing, because standards tend to adapt to reality.
This is seen to imply that life-satisfaction reacts only to short
term ups and downs and that it is insensitive to long term qual-
ity-of-life. All this boils down to the thesis that life-satisfaction
is ‘relative’ and therefore lacks any absolute value.
Again qualms are based on the assumption that life-satisfac-
tion results from cognitive evaluation that anchors in social
construction rather than in human nature. Life-satisfaction is
seen to result from perceived realisation of wants. Above I have
argued rather that life-satisfaction reflects gratification of needs,
since nature has safeguarded the meeting of essential conditions
by linking it to hedonic affect. That is why we cannot feel well
without companionship and some challenge in the long term,
but can easily adapt to a life without colour-TV. Though it is
difficult to prove that life-satisfaction draws on the gratification
of needs, it can be proved that it does not depend on realisation
of wants. Elsewhere I have falsified several implications of this
theory (Veenhoven, 1991, 1995) and as yet I have not seen good
counter evidence.
A problem in this discussion is that the objections do apply
to several domain satisfactions. In his famous study among
American soldiers, Stouffer (1949) showed that career-satisfac-
tion depends on social comparison, a phenomenon that came to
be known as ‘relative deprivation’. In the case of income-satis-
faction there is also experimental evidence for ‘reference shifts’
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(e.g. VanPraag, 1989). These findings are wrongly generalised to
all satisfactions. Yet the informational basis differs across ob-
jects of satisfaction. Other domain satisfactions draw much
more on internal information, for instance satisfaction with
marriage and satisfaction with health. In an evolutionary per-
spective it is likely that satisfaction with the most vital domains
of life draw least on social comparison. In that context it is the
more understandable that life-satisfaction draws on hedonic
level of affect rather than on social comparison. Not only is this
an evident and compelling source of information but also there
is no good alternative for appraising life-as-a-whole. Income
can be easily compared with the Jones’ but overall quality of
life is difficult to determine in compare.
Suitability of Life-Satisfaction in this Context
After refuting all these qualms about life-satisfaction it is good
to bring its strong points back to mind. My goal in this paper is
to test the theory that inequality is on the rise in modern soci-
ety and for this purpose I need an indicator of inequality that
meets three demands. In the first place the measure should
reflect difference in ‘relevant’ resources, there is no point in
measuring inequality in access to pettiness. Secondly the mea-
sure chosen should comprehensively capture all these inequali-
ties; restriction to inequality in particular resources can
seriously distort the picture. Thirdly, the measure should be
comparable across time and nations, which is required for test-
ing the claim that inequality is returning in modern society.
How well are these demands met when we measure social
inequality by dispersion of life-satisfaction?
Above I have argued that life-satisfaction depends on the
gratification of needs, rather than on the perceived realisation
of wants. Thereby this indicator meets the demand of ‘rele-
vance’. Life-satisfaction is enjoyment of one’s life-as-a-whole
and I have argued that life-satisfaction is one of the most
encompassing indicators of quality-of-life available. So, this
indicator also meets the requirement of comprehensiveness.
Lastly we have seen that life-satisfaction is well measurable
within and across nations. Hence life-satisfaction also meets the
comparability requirement.
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So, all these demands are met by the proposed method of
measuring inequality using the standard deviation of life-satis-
faction. Moreover, this indicator has the beauty of simplicity.
Availability of Data
Life-satisfaction is a current item in welfare surveys, so there is
a lot of data on dispersion of life-satisfaction in nations. These
data are readily available in the World Database of Happiness9,
which presents observed means and standard deviations of life-
satisfaction for all general population studies ever held.
There are now data about all the rich nations and the former
communist countries, but the data for third World nations are
still incomplete. Time-series data are available for the USA
since 1945, for Japan since 1958 and for the EU-nations
since 1973. This suffices to test the hypothesis under investiga-
tion.
Research Questions
Now we have a new measure of inequality in nations, we can
go on to specify how this indicator can be used to test the the-
ory of growing inequality in modern society.
A preliminary test is to check whether the distribution of life-
satisfaction tends to a bi-modal pattern. This is implied in
notions of an emerging ‘split’ in society. Frequency distribu-
tions can be visually inspected for such a pattern.
The main test is to inspect whether standard deviations did
increase over time. This can be checked by a correlational anal-
ysis in which size of the standard deviation is crossed with the
year of observation. This test will be elaborated by partialling
out a possible confounding factor, that is, increase in the level
of happiness.
Lastly, the wider theory of modern inequality can also be tes-
ted by comparing dispersion of life-satisfaction across nations,
and in particular by comparing standard deviations in more and
less advanced countries. If the theory of the U-curved time
trend holds truth, we can expect greater inequality in the most
advanced nations in the 1990s.
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DATA
The analysis is based on two data-sources, the Eurobarometer
surveys over the years 1973–2001 and the World Value Surveys
in the 1990s.
Eurobarometer
The Eurobarometer survey is held twice a year in all EU mem-
ber states and involves representative samples of the population
aged 15 years and older. The regular sample size is about 1000
in each country. This survey program started in 1973 in the
nine member states of that time: Belgium, Britain, Denmark,
France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and West
Germany. Greece joined in 1980, Portugal and Spain in 1985.
The surveys have also been held in Austria, East Germany and
Sweden since1990. All surveys involved a question about life-
satisfaction, which reads as follows:
‘On the whole, how satisfied are you with the life you lead?’
• very satisfied
• fairly satisfied
• not very satisfied
• not at all satisfied
The responses to the question are then given numerical values;
‘very satisfied’ is denoted as 4 and ‘not at all satisfied’ as 1. On
that four-step scale, the standard deviation can maximally be
1,5 (if 50% scores ‘4’ and the other 50% ‘1’) and minimally
zero (100% of the responses in one response category).
The life-satisfaction item was in the core-module from the
beginning. Since 1997, life-satisfaction is assessed only once a
year. Since the aim is to compare over a time I did not in-
clude the countries that joined in 1990 or later. This leaves
us with 12 cases, 9 nations with a time-series of 23 years, one
with a time-series of 16 years and two with a time-series of
11 years. Given some missing cases, the total number of data
points is 447.
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World Value Survey
The World Value Survey started as an extension of the Euro-
pean Value Study. The first wave took place in the early 1980s
and involved 28 nations. The second and third waves were held
in the 1990s and involve altogether 53 nations. The fourth wave
was completed in the years 1999–2001 and covered 60 nations.
Together this provides us 81 nations in the 1990s.
Alongside questions about happiness and mood, the ques-
tionnaire also includes a single item on life-satisfaction. This
question reads as follows.
This 10-step numerical response scale provides a better view on
the dispersion of responses than the 4-step verbal scale of the
Eurobarometer.
Data were sourced from Inglehart (2004). An overview of the
standard deviations per country is available on the World Data-
base of Happiness (Veenhoven, 2004).
RESULTS
No Bi-Modal Distributions
In theory the distribution of responses could take five different
shapes. These possible distributions are presented in Figure 3.
In present day nations, most observed distributions are of the
same type, the negatively10 skewed uni-modal distribution. The
distribution of responses to the 10-step life-satisfaction question
in Western Europe is presented in Figure 4 as an example. Nor-
mal distributions appeared in some developing nations such as
Bangladesh. Positively skewed distributions are observed in
post-communist countries such as Armenia and in African
nations such as Zimbabwe.
In none of the 80 countries in the World Value Survey did
we find a bi-modal distribution of life-satisfaction, nor did we
‘All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole now?’
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Satisfied dissatisfied
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Figure 3. Possible patterns of dispersion.
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observe any tendency towards such a pattern over time in the
Eurobarometer surveys. In this light talk about ‘split-society’
appears to be mere rhetoric.
Standard-Deviations Diminished Over Time
Growing inequality is more likely to manifest in a flattening of
the distribution, which will (also) manifest in a rise in standard
deviations. This possibility was checked on the Eurobarometer
data, which allow a comparison over 28 years (1973–2001).
As a first check, standard deviations were plotted against
time for each nation separately. Visual inspection shows a de-
cline in most cases. Standard deviations declined in ten of the
thirteen nations, and in six of these the decline was statistically
significant (p<0.05). Standard deviations got slightly higher in
Figure 4. Actual distribution of life-satisfaction in modern Western Europe.
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three countries (France, East Germany and Ireland) but none of
these ascents were significant12.
In order to visualise the general pattern; the data are also
presented in a joint plot. For this purpose the standard devia-
tions of the different nations per year are combined in an aver-
age that is weighted by population size. The combination in an
average is required to see the time-trend, which otherwise gets
lost in the variation across nations. Weighting by population
size is required to prevent distortion due to little countries such
as Luxembourg.
The result is presented on Figure 5, where we can see a clear
pattern of declining standard deviations, in other words, a
growing equality in life-satisfaction. The unstandardized regres-
sion coefficient is )0.00176, which means a yearly drop of
inequality by 0.18%. The 95% confidence interval around that
value ranges from )0.001 to )0.003. Since the value zero is not
in that range, we can take it as read that inequality did decrease
in Western Europe over these years. The decease is quite small
however, if this trend continues linearly, it will take about
50 years to reduce the standard deviation on this 4-step scale
from its current level of 0.7 to 0.6. Another 300 years would be
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Figure 5. Trend in dispersion of life-satisfaction in the European Union.
RUUT VEENHOVEN474
required to reduce the standard deviation to zero. However,
long-term development usually goes in small steps.
More so in Southern Europe
Figure 5 does not include the three Mediterranean nations
that entered the EU later: Greece, Portugal, and Spain. I also
considered these cases separately. Since they are all South-
European nations, I added the other South-European nation to
this cluster, that is, Italy. As a contrast group I selected four
typical North European nations (Britain, Denmark, West Ger-
many and The Netherlands). For all of latter we have data
since 1973.
The data are presented in Figure 6a and b. In these figures
the fat trend-line in the middle represents the mean level of life-
satisfaction and the thin lines the variation around that mean.
In Figure 6a we can see that the level raised somewhat in the
North-European nations between 1973 and 2001, and that
the dispersion of life-satisfaction became slightly smaller. The
homogenisation around the mean is hardly visible however. In
Figure 6b we see a similar pattern in South-Europe over the
years 1985–2001, both the rise of average level of life-satisfaction
and the reduction in spread are better visible. Note that the
level of life-satisfaction is substantially lower in the South-
European countries.
Reduction Dispersion not Wholly Attributable to Rising Average
We have seen that the distribution of responses on the 10-step
scale is quite skewed in Figure 4. Further rises in the level of
life-satisfaction will produce an even greater concentration in
these response categories. As a result, standard deviations will
be lower. The 4-step response scale used in the Figures 5 and 6
could enhance this effect, because it provides only two grada-
tions at the positive side12.
A partial correlation analysis was performed to estimate
the pure trend of dispersion. Dispersion of life-satisfaction
was correlated with year, while controlling for average level of
life-satisfaction. Since all the nations are included, the analysis
is limited to the years 1985–2001. The results are presented in
Figure 7. The zero-order correlation confirms that dispersion of
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life-satisfaction is linked to level of life-satisfaction (r=)0.75),
and that the level has risen over these years (r=+0.56). Yet we
also see that the decline of dispersion was even stronger
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Figure 6. Trend in life-satisfaction in Northern and Southern EU nations.
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(r = )0.75) and that statistical control of the rising level
reduces the trend only marginally (rp=)0.46). Similar results
were obtained when this analysis was performed on different
sets of nations and for different periods.
Similar Trend in Japan and USA
A look at the World Database of Happiness (Veenhoven, 2005)
reveals that standard deviations of life-satisfaction have also
diminished in Japan and in the USA. So this is not just a local
European pattern, but also a wider concomitant of modernisa-
tion.
Dispersion Lowest in Most Modern Nations
Next to the above comparison through time, I also compared
across nations. Since the theory of modern inequality sees grow-
ing differences in society as a result of societal evolution, it
would predict greater dispersion of life-satisfaction in the most
advanced nations.
For a first global check, look back at Figure 6. By all stan-
dards, the North-European nations in Figure 6a are more ad-
vanced than the South-European nations in Figure 6b. Yet in
1985 the dispersion of life-satisfaction was somewhat smaller in
 MeanS.D. 
Year
rp=  -.61 
rp=  -.46 
r= -.68 r=+.56
rp=+.,11 
r=  -.75 
Figure 7. Partial correlation analysis of level, dispersion and year.
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the former nations (SD=0.67) than in the latter (SD=0.71),
which is contrary to the hypothesis. In 1996 the dispersion was
about the same in North and South Europe, which also does
not fit the theory, particularly not since the South-European na-
tions had gone through a modernisation spurt. The only piece
of support for the prediction is in the linear extrapolation of the
trend to the future, which suggests that Southern dispersion will
soon dip under northern dispersion.
A limitation of this comparison is that it is about only eight
countries and that the difference in social development between
these nations is not too great. We get a better view on the link
between modernity and inequality if we consider a larger and
more varied set of nations. For this purpose I analysed the data
from the World Values Survey. Standard deviations on 10-step
life-satisfaction were plotted against several indicators of
modernity of nations.
Correlational analysis shows that dispersion of life-satisfaction
is negatively related to all indicators of modernity. There is a
very strong negative correlation with economic development13
(r=)0.68). Likewise dispersion of life-satisfaction correlates
negatively with freedom in private life14 ()0.59), informatisa-
tion15 ()0.45), urbanisation16 ()0.30) education17, ()0.48) and
tolerance ()0.46). These latter correlations are much abated
when economic development is controlled, but the statistical
relations with freedom and informatisation remain significant
(rp=)0.35 and )0.32 respectively). Together these variables
explain 77% of the differences in dispersion of life-satisfaction.
The scattergram of dispersion in life-satisfaction by economic
affluence is presented in Figure 8. This scattergram does not
reveal a U shaped pattern. The relationship is quite linear, dis-
persion of life-satisfaction being smallest in the most modern
nations. Inspection of the other scattergrams also does not
reveal any such U-curve. So the theory of theory of ‘The Great
U-turn’ appears to be wrong. What we see is the reverse.
Interestingly, the correlation between dispersion of life-satisfac-
tion and income-inequality18 is not too strong: r=+0.30. This
supports my contention that income differences capture only a
part of the variation in access to relevant resources in present
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day society. Ott (2005) discusses this matter in more detail in
this issue.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this paper was to check the notion that social
inequality is on the return in modern society. The data used
here clearly contradict that idea and in fact show the converse,
disparities in life-satisfaction have become smaller instead of
larger. In this respect, modernisation still goes hand in hand
with egalisation.
0 10000 20000 30000
1997 Purchasing power p/c
1,00
1,50
2,00
2,50
3,00
3,50
19
90
s 
di
sp
e
rs
io
n
 
in
 
lif
e
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n
Belgium
Brazil
CanadaColombia
Czech.Rep.
Denmark
Egypt
ElSalvador
Finland
France
Greece
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Israe l
Japan Luxembourg
Malta
Mexico
Netherlands
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Poland
Romania
S-Korea
Slovakia
Tanzania
Ukraine
USA
Figure 8. Scattergram of SD life-satisfaction by economic development.
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Compatibility with Evidence of Modern Deprivation
Still, the idea of growing inequality in modern society must
come from somewhere, and there are indeed indications of wid-
ening gaps in some life-chances. In some countries at least,
incomes increased less at the bottom of the income distribution
than at the top and there are also reports about widening class
differences in educational achievement. More important, there
are also signs of growing disparities in outcomes of life. In West
Germany, the poor became less happy between 1988 and 1998,
both absolutely and relatively (Bulmahn, 2000: 423). Likewise
some investigators have observed growing class difference in
health and life expectancy (Kunst et al., 2001). How can this be
reconciled with the observed egalitarisation of life-satisfaction?
Fit with Disparities in Chances
One answer has already been mentioned in the introduction to
this paper. Not all differences hurt. Only differences in access
to relevant resources will materialise in dispersion of life-
satisfaction. So, the newly emerged disparities are probably
not essential for need gratification. Since these disparities most-
ly concern money matters, this is quite probable. Income differ-
ences hardly matter in affluent society. Though most people
would like more money, they do not really need it. Hence rela-
tive income hardly affects happiness in rich nations (Veenhoven,
1999; Schyns, 2001).
The other answer is that people may have become more able
in dealing with the problems of life. Below I will discuss that
hypothesis in more detail. If this is true, this may have compen-
sated possible declines in distributional justice in some fields.
Fit with Difference in Outcomes
The reports of widening disparities in life-results are more prob-
lematic at first sight. Still there are several possible explanations.
A methodical explanation could be that these reports reflect
mere blips in hectic development rather than the main trend.
We can see in the trend plots for separate countries (Veenhoven,
2005) that there is also lot of variation in standard deviations of
life-satisfaction and that differences have widened temporarily
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in some cases. Since inequality is a hot issue, this can give rise
to selective reporting.
A substantive explanation could be that people become ever
more satisfied in modern society (which reduces the standard
deviation), but that the dwindling number of dissatisfied are
concentrated at the bottom of the social ladder. This could be
due to the fact that social mobility has become more dependent
on psychological characteristics that are closely linked to life-sat-
isfaction, such as assertiveness, energy and self-control. Yet this
explanation implies that the correlation between life-satisfaction
and social prestige must have grown over time and such a devel-
opment is not visible in the available data (World Database of
Happiness, Catalog of Correlates, Subject code S 9). So, if this
effect exists at all, it must be small in size or number.
Possible Explanations
This leaves us with the question why inequality has decreased
during the last decade. Proving causality borders on impossible
in this trade, but I can suggest two lines of explanation.
For this purpose I invite the reader to recall the fourfold
classification of qualities of life, presented in the introductory
section. This scheme helps to see that the observed reduction in
dispersion of life-satisfaction can be explained by two kinds of
life-chances: external and internal chances. If we depart from
external chances, we can explain the egalitarisation of
life-results by greater equality in access to scarce resources,
which fits current thinking. If we consider internal chances, the
equalisation of life-results must be attributed to more equal life-
abilities. To my knowledge this is a somewhat rare perspective.
More Equal Access?
As noted in the introduction of this paper it is commonly
believed that inequality in access to scarce resources has widened
over the last decade, in particular access to a good income. Now
that we have seen that dispersion in life-satisfaction has dimin-
ished, we must consider the reverse, that is, that differences in
access have decreased, at least differences in access to relevant
resources. This is not unlikely if one considers the following
developments.
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Firstly, modernisation has created a more livable environment for
most people. Some may doubt this fact when reading the newspa-
per, but it is a matter of fact is that we live longer and happier than
ever (Veenhoven, 2005b). This rise in access to relevant resources for
everybody has diminished the difference in access to these.
Secondly, modernisation involves individualisation and life-
style differentiation and may thus have created a greater diver-
sity of opportunity structures. This may have reduced scarcity
of resources and it may also have produced a better fit of socie-
tal supply to the citizens’ needs.
Further it is evident that many traditional inequalities have
lessened, the social ladder has shortened; status differences have
become less pervasive and as a consequence respect has become
a less scarce commodity. This reflects in the rising self esteem in
modern society. Several minorities have successfully pressed for
equal opportunities during the last decades, in particular
women, handicapped people, homosexuals, black people and
the elderly. The politics of empowerment seem to have worked
and still to be working for the new migrants.
This is not to deny that modernisation has also created ‘new
inequalities’ but apparently these developments have been
counter balanced in some way.
More Equal Life-Ability?
Commonly ‘access to resources’ is seen in terms of rights and
opportunities linked to social positions. Access is then a matter
of distributional justice, which depends on the structure of soci-
ety. Yet access depends also on personal capabilities, such as
understanding and perseverance. Personal wisdom is especially
crucial where access to ‘relevant’ resources is concerned,
because this requires insight into what one really needs. Seen in
this light, the reduction in dispersion of life-satisfaction can also
be explained by a growing ability to deal with the problems of
life. The more able people are, the more of them will succeed in
gratifying their needs and hence become more satisfied with
their life.
Why might life-ability have increased in Western Europe
over the last decade? Again several possibilities come to mind.
One possibility is that opportunities for personality
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development have improved, pedagogy has begun to focus more
on autonomy, formal education has been extended and the peri-
od of youth has been lengthened, providing more opportunity
for experimentation. Another possible reason is the progress
made in treatment of mental problems. Both psychotherapy and
the psycho-pharmacy have improved considerably, and this may
be responsible for the substantial reduction in the percentage
‘very dissatisfied’ found in the general population.
Treatment for unhappiness is often denounced as ‘mind con-
trol’. The easy rebuttal of this argument is that the observed
egalitarisation of life-satisfaction cannot be fully explained in
this way, e.g. because only a part of the dissatisfied are depres-
sive. A more basic retort is that the greater availability of treat-
ment is a typical case of more equal access to relevant
resources. Why sniff at general access to anti-depressants while
bemoaning inequalities in access to heart-surgery?
CONCLUSION
Social inequality in nations can be measured by the dispersion
of life-satisfaction. Application of this indicator reveals that
inequality is declining in modern society. Comparison over time
in the EU nations over the years 1973–2001 shows that the
standard deviation of life-satisfaction has gradually decreased.
Comparison across 53 of the world’s nations in the 1990s also
shows that standard deviations are systematically smaller in the
most modern nations. This means that the long-term trend to-
ward lessening inequality is still actively ongoing.
NOTES
1 The initial rise in income inequality after the industrial revulution is
known as the Kunetz curve (Kunetz, 1955).
2 One of the problems is assessing how much people earn, especially if
non-monetary income is involved. Another problem is adjusting for house-
hold size, so called ‘equivalence income’.
3 The correlation between household income and life-satisfaction reflects
not only causal effects of income on life-satisfaction, but also effects of life-
satisfaction on earning chances. Moreover, part of the correlation is due to a
spurious effect of health.
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4 This pattern is reproduced in the dataset used here (which involves 10 more
nations). The correlation between income-inequality in nations and average
life-satisfaction is +0.04, the correlation with self-rated health is +0.12. This
lack of correlation is not due to insensitivity of life-satisfaction or self-rated
health, since these variables appear to be strongly related to nation character-
istics such as economic development, political freedom and good governance.
5 This might seem incompatible with the common finding that, within
nations, relatively poor people tend to be less healthy, though hardly less
happy. Yet this correlation is not necessarily caused by low-income position
and can also be due to selection (less earning power of the less healthy) and
culture (health behavior of the poor). The absence of a correlation at the
nation level adds to the plausibility of these alternative explanations for
the correlation at the individual level.
6 Using self-rated health instead could solve both problems. This appears
to be a good predictor of longevity (Idler and Benyamini, 1997) and timely
measurement is possible by surveys. Self-rated health is an item in the World
Value Surveys, so comparison across nations is possible. Comparison across
time is less easy; though several nations have time series of twenty years or
more, the items are not identical.
7 About 80% of the differences in average life-satisfaction in nations can
be explained by variation in ‘hard’ societal characteristics such as affluence,
freedom and justice (Veenhoven, 1997)
8 If involved at all, this distortion is must be limited. Later on we will see
that 77% of the differences in dispersion of life-satisfaction can be explained
by country characteristics such as economic affluence and respect for human
rights, which is unlikely to occur if standard deviations of life-satisfaction
were much attenuated by random measurement error.
9 The word ‘happiness’ is used synonymously with ‘life-satisfaction’.
10 ‘Negatively skewed’ means that the skew is at the negative side of the dis-
tribution and this implies more observations at the positive side.
11 This test of significance is based on the assumption that these observa-
tions represent an a-select sample of time points in that era. This assumption
is not too far fetched, since we are dealing with data from periodical surveys.
In the comparison accross nations, I will not subject the observed correla-
tions to a significance test, because the set of nations considered cannot be
considered to be a sample from a wider population.
12 The 10-step life-satisfaction item is less vulnerable to this type of distor-
tion, but the World Value Studies do not (yet) allow comparison over a sub-
stantial period of time.
13 Economic development measured by buying power p/c. Data Human
Development Report 1998.
14 Freedom in private life measured by opportunity to choose in matters of
marriage, procreation, religion and termination of ones own life. Opportu-
nity to choose measured by public acceptance and absence of legal restraint.
Data drawn from Veenhoven (2000c).
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15 Informatisation measured by internet users p/c. Data Human Develop-
ment Report 1998.
16 Urbanisation measured by % urban population. Data Human Develop-
ment Report 1998.
17 Educational level in nations measured by gross school enrolment ratio.
Data Human Development Report 1998.
18 Income-inequality in nations in the 1990s as measured by the Gini-coeffi-
cient of the total income distribution. Data: World Culture Report table 28.
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